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1. Issue
This paper explores the nature of focus in light of Japanese expressions. As 
suggested in the literature, focus is projected by phonological marking, however 
it is theoretically implemented (e.g., Jackendoff (1972)). To make the point, let 
us describe what counts as a focus, as shown in (1) (see Ishihara (2001) for rele-
vant discussions on Japanese):
(1) Sucient condition & necessary condition for focus (descriptive)
 a. If XP answers the part asked in a question, XP is a focus.
 b. If XP is a focus, XP contains phonological prominence.
Thus, if XP answers the part asked in a question, XP must contain phonological 
prominence, indicated by boldface (e.g., John-ga ‘John-Nom’)). Given that the part 
asked in a yes-no question is signaled by phonological prominence, we can ac-
count for the contrast in (2), where (B), but not (A), is a felicitous answer to (Q):
(2) Q: John-wa   Mary-ni   LGB-o   ageta-nodesuka? (Yes-no question)
  John-Top  Mary-Dat  LGB-Acc gave-Q
  ‘Did John give Mary LGB?’
 A: # Hai, John-wa  Mary-ni   LGB-o    agemasita.
   Yes  John-Top Mary-Dat LGB-Acc  gave 
   ‘Yes, John gave Mary LGB.’
 B:  Hai,  John-wa  Mary-ni   LGB-o    agemasita. 
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Note that, while the notion of focus described in (1) is substantial (hence, the 
contrast above), it does not change the truth condition of a sentence on its own, 
whichever XP may encode it; for example, (2A) is true iff (2B) is true.
Let us now introduce the issue addressed in this paper: How can focus be in-
volved in the interpretation of expressions? In the literature on Japanese, some re-
searchers claim that focus is a semantic input/argument for particular lexical 
items, but such an argument-taking relation is formed syntactically (e.g., Aoyagi 
(1994), Nakanishi (2008), Kotani (2008)). An analysis in this direction treats the 
nature of focus particles (FPs), such as the additive mo ‘also,’ as stated in (3):
(3) C-command condition for focus particles (e.g., Jackendoff (1972))
 As their semantic inputs, FPs take foci that they c-command.
For example, Aoyagi (1994: 24) points out that, when mo takes a VP as its syn-
tactic complement, as shown in (4a), it can induce at least the three different 
readings given in (4b-d), depending on which element within the VP is identi-
fied with a focus:
(4) a.  John-wa  [VP  [NP  sakana]-o  [V yaki]]-mo   si-ta.
  John-Top       fish-Acc     bake-also   do-Past
  ‘John also baked the fish.’
 b.  If the VP is a focus:
  John baked the sh besides doing something else (e.g., boil the egg)
 c.  If the NP is a focus:
  John baked the sh besides something else (e.g., the beef).
 d.  If the V is a focus:
  John baked the sh besides doing something else with it (e.g., fry).
Aoyagi’s point is that mo cannot be associated with the subject (i.e., John-wa), 
even if it is stressed. Thus, FPs can only interact with foci that they c-command, 
and in principle they can be non-locally associated with whichever focus they c-
command, as in the case of (4c). Note that the c-command condition demands 
the additional theoretical device in (5) (or some variants, such as Kotani’s (2008) 
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overt lowering):
(5) Covert raising of focus particles
 FPs can covertly move to be attached to the projection of a higher head.
This option is intended to capture the fact that FPs are not always associated 
with foci that they overtly c-command (e.g., Aoyagi (1994)). For example, let us 
consider (6), where mo is attached to the object NP:
(6)  John-wa  [VP [NP sakana]-mo  yai]-ta.
  John-Top      fish-also    bake-Past
  ‘John baked also the fish.’
Here the FP can take as its semantic input either the NP or the VP, both of which 
contain the phonological prominence of the noun sakana ‘fish’ and can be candi-
dates for an actual focus. More specifically, (6) can make an additive presupposi-
tion either with regard to the NP, as in (7a), or the VP, as in (7b):
(7) a.  John-wa  [NP  niku]-dake-zyanaku  [NP  sakana]-mo   yai-ta.
  John-Top    meat-only-not         fish-even     bake-Past
  ‘John baked, not only the meat, but also the fish.’
 b.  John-wa  [VP  niku-o   itame]-tekara  [VP  sakana-mo  yai]-ta.
  John-Top    meat-Acc fry-after       fish-also    bake-Past
  ‘After frying the meat, John baked also the fish.’ 
Thus, under the c-command condition in (3), the FP is required to move covert-
ly above the VP to ensure the semantic ambiguity of (6), as schematized in (8):
(8) a.  Base structure: [VP [NP N]-FP V]    ? NP-association reading
 b.  Covert raising:  [VP [NP N]-t1 V]-FP1  ? VP-association reading
The aim of this paper is to argue against this “syntactic association” view of 
FPs by investigating the interpretive nature of the additive mo. The discussion is 
developed as follows. Section 2 makes arguments against the c-command condi-
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tion for FPs and the covert raising of FPs. Section 3 offers an alternative ap-
proach to the focus effect by adopting Schwarzschild’s (1999) and Kehler’s (2002) 
theory of discourse coherence. Section 4 concludes with a summary.
2. Counterarguments
2.1.  No C-command Condition for Focus Particles
Let us argue against the “syntactic association” view of FPs by showing the 
invalidity of one prediction that the c-command condition makes. That is, if FPs 
can be freely associated with foci that they c-command, we predict that they can 
always induce the same type of reading in the two configurations given in (9):
(9) a.  Local conguration: [VP [NP N]-FP V]
  The FP is attached to the object NP, and the object NP is a focus.
 b.  Non-local conguration: [VP [NP N] V]-FP
  The FP is attached to the VP, and the object NP is a focus.
However, this prediction is incorrect, as there are some cases where the local 
configuration is acceptable, but not the non-local configuration, showing that 
they cannot always induce the same reading. For example, let us consider the 
paradigm in (10):
(10)a.   John-wa  [[zutto  kai-takat-ta]    DVD]-mo   kat-ta.  
   John-Top  since  buy-want-Past  DVD-also  buy-Past
   ‘John bought also the DVD he had wanted to buy all the time.’
 b. # John-wa  [[zutto  kai-takat-ta]    DVD]-o   kai-mo-si-ta.  
   John-Top  since  buy-want-Past  DVD-Acc buy-also-do-Past
   ‘John also bought the DVD he had wanted to buy all the time.’
In (10a), the attachment of mo to the NP leads to a reading where John bought 
the DVD which he had wanted to buy, in addition to something else (e.g., a new-
arrival DVD). Importantly, such a reading entails that the whole NP serves as a 
focus, so that we predict that mo can be associated with the NP even in the non-
local configuration. Nevertheless, in (10b), the attachment of mo to the VP does 
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not result in the same reading as above. Rather, it sounds odd as it stands. Thus, 
the contrast in (10) makes a challenge to the c-command condition for FPs.
Note that clarifying the oddness of (10b) makes a further argument against 
the c-command condition. The point is that the FP mo takes as its associate, not 
a focus that it c-commands, but just the “whole” of its very complement. To be 
more specific, let us tentatively assume that, when attached to the VP, mo must 
contrast its meaning as a “more surprising” choice. Thus, (10b) is odd because it 
is unsurprising that John buys the DVDs that he wants to buy. One prediction 
from this account is that, if the VP with mo as a whole expresses a “more sur-
prising” choice, the sentence should be acceptable. This is borne out by (11), 
where we add to (10b) the floating universal quantifier zenbu ‘all,’ associated 
with the accusative object:
(11) John-wa  [[zutto kai-takat-ta]   DVD]-o   zenbu  kai-mo-si-ta. 
  John-Top  since buy-want-Past  DVD-Acc  all    buy-also-do-Past
  ‘John bought also all the DVDs he had wanted to buy all the time.’
For (11), we can infer that it is more surprising that he buys all of the DVDs that 
he wanted to buy, than that he buys one of them. Thus, FPs are simply associated 
with the interpretive content of their syntactic complement, not of any constitu-
ent of it.
One might suggest that, in (11), mo can identify the newly added element 
(i.e., zenbu) with a focus, which it c-commands, and can somehow induce an ac-
ceptable result in contrast to (10b). Still, this account is problematic in two re-
spects. First, FPs in general cannot be attached directly to universal quantifiers, 
as shown in (12), suggesting that zenbu is not a candidate for the semantic input 
to mo:
(12) * John-wa  [[zutto  kai-takat-ta]   DVD]-o  zenbu  -mo  kat-ta.  
   John-Top  since  buy-want-Past DVD-Acc all-also   buy-Past
   ‘John also bought all the DVDs he had wanted to buy all the time.’
Second, it is not true that any floating quantifier can suffice to improve (10b). For 
example, numeral quantifiers, such as ichimai ‘one,’ do not work, as shown in (13):
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(13) # John-wa  [[zutto kai-takat-ta]   DVD]-o   ichimai  kai-mo-si-ta.
  John-Top   since buy-want-Past DVD-Acc one     buy-also-do-Past
  ‘John also bought one of the DVDs he had wanted to buy all the time.’
Thus, the conclusion is still the same: the semantic input to FPs is simply their 
syntactic complement. This means that the c-command condition is not tenable 
in that it fails to account for the contrast in (10).
2.2.  No Covert Raising of Focus Particles
We now argue against the covert raising of FPs in two respects: lack of em-
pirical necessity and lack of theoretical detail. First, we can no longer posit any 
empirical motivation for it, because we have disproved the c-command condi-
tion for FPs. That is, if FPs do not rely on c-command to determine their seman-
tic inputs, it is not clear whether FPs must move covertly to higher positions to 
c-command foci. Second, we cannot make any particular predictions for the op-
eration, because its detail is not explicit. For example, it is not evident what posi-
tions FPs can covertly move to. Thus, this situation prevents us from verifying its 
empirical adequacy.
Still, we consider one possible solution to the second problem for the sake 
of argument. That is, let us suppose that FPs can covertly move to any positions 
where they can overtly occur (cf. Kotani (2008)). This assumption can explain 
why the mo example in (14a) is ambiguous between “NP-association” and “VP-
association” readings, because mo can be overtly attached to VPs, as shown in 
(14b):
(14)a.  John-wa  [VP [NP sakana]-mo  yai]-ta.
  John-Top      fish-also    bake-Past
  ‘John baked also the fish.’
 b.  John-wa  [VP [NP sakana]-o   yaki]-mo-si-ta.
  John-Top      fish-also    bake-also-do-Past
  ‘John also baked the fish.’
Then we predict that, if the overt attachment of mo to a VP results in an accepta-
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ble sentence, the overt attachment to its object NP should, too, because mo can 
undergo covert raising to the VP.
However, this prediction is incorrect for one empirical paradigm. That is, it 
is not clear why mo cannot undergo covert raising when attached to universal 
quantifiers. We recall that mo cannot be overtly attached to universal quantifiers, 
as in (12); call this a UQ-R(estriction). Then, if mo can covertly move to a VP 
from its overt position, its attachment to the object universal quantifier should be 
able to nullify the UQ-R. The fact contrary to this is given in (15b), where mo 
causes a UQ-R violation:
(15)a.   John-wa  [VP [NP zen’in]-o     kibisiku  sikari]-mo-si-ta.
   John-Top      everyone-Acc severely scold-also-do-Past
   ‘John also scolded everyone severely.’
 b. * John-wa  [VP [NP zen’in]-mo    kibisiku  sikat]-ta.
   John-Top      everyone-also severely scold-Past
   ‘John scolded also everyone severely.’
Thus, we need a better solution for the detail of covert raising, and such a solu-
tion must be able to predict the existence or absence of the UQ-R. After all, the 
problem with covert raising is that its detail is not clear enough to cover the con-
trast in (15).
2.3.  Summary: Toward a Semantic and Pragmatic Analysis
We conclude that the syntactic association view of FPs is untenable; the c-
command condition for FPs and the covert raising of FPs cannot be adopted on 
theoretical and empirical grounds. This suggests two new directions for the 
analysis of the focus effect on FPs: a dierent syntactic approach or a non-syntac-
tic approach.
Let us take the second route, as there is evidence in its favor. The point is 
that there are some cases for which the “alleged” effect of covert raising cannot 
be readily obtained. For example, (16b) is much more difficult to accept than 
(16a):
(16)a.   John-wa  [VP  niku-o   itame ]-tekara  [VP  sakana-mo   yai]-ta.
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   John-Top    meat-Acc fry-after        fish-also     bake-Past
   ‘After frying the meat, John baked also the fish.’ 
 b. # John-wa  [VP  niku-o   sute ]-tekara   [VP  sakana-mo   yai]-ta.
   John-Top    meat-Acc dump-after      fish-also     bake-Past
   ‘After throwing away the meat, John baked also the fish.’
This minimal pair shows that the “alleged” effect of covert raising is under se-
mantic and pragmatic control, as it is not a syntactically minimal pair. Thus, one 
alternative to covert raising is to take the semantics and pragmatics of FPs more 
seriously.
3. Alternative Approach
3.1.  Assumptions
Let us begin by outlining the theoretical framework under which we pre-
sent a semantic analysis of the focus effect. First, we adopt Heim and Kratzer’s 
(1998) theory of the syntax-semantics mapping. A semantic model that we as-
sume is a structure <E, F>, where E = a set of entities, and F = a function assign-
ing a denotation to each expression. Let [[α]]g be the denotation of expression α 
under a variable-value assignment g. Then the basic semantic types of [[α]]g are 
the entity type e and the proposition type t, and for any semantic types x and y, 
<x, y> is a semantic type. We then assume the syntax-semantics mapping rule 
given in (17):1)
(17)Functional Application (FA) (cf. Heim and Kratzer (1998: 95))
  Let α be a branching node with daughters β and γ, where [[β]]g is a 
function whose domain contains [[γ]]g. Then [[α]]g = [[β]]g([[γ]]g).
Second, we adopt Schwarzschild’s (1999) theory of discourse coherence that 
exploits focus to organize successive utterances in terms of anaphora. Under this 
theory, the discourse appropriateness of an utterance U is evaluated by calculat-
ing which constituent of U is not a focus, as stated in (18):
(18)GIVENness Constraint (cf. Schwarzschild (1999: 155))
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 Every constituent of U must be GIVEN, unless it is (part of) the focus.
The first approximation to the definition of GIVEN is this: an utterance U is 
GIVEN i U is entailed by prior discourse (Schwarzschild (1999: 147)). However, 
entailment is a relation held between propositions. To apply it to non-proposi-
tional units as well, Schwarzschild proposes the two interpretive operations 
shown in (19) and (20):
(19)Existential Type-shiing (?-TS) (cf. Schwarzschild (1999: 147))
  ?-TS(α) is the result of raising α to type t by existentially binding un-
filled arguments of α, if any.
(20)Existential F-closure (?-FC) (cf. Schwarzschild (1999: 150))
  ?-FC(α) is the result of applying ?-TS to α and replacing focused con-
stituents in ?-TS(α), if any, with existentially bound variables.
Schwarzschild then gives the final (informal) definition of GIVEN, as stated in 
(21):
(21)GIVEN (cf. Schwarzschild (1999: 151))
 An utterance U is GIVEN iff U has a salient antecedent A, and
 a.  if U is of type e, then A and U co-refer.
 b.  otherwise, ?-TS(A) entails ?-FC(U).
For us, the point of this theory is the workings of ?-FC, which require that a fo-
cus of U be replaced with an existentially bound variable to calculate whether eve-
ry constituent of U satisfies the GIVENness Constraint. For details on how to 
analyze the focus effect in question-answer pairs such as (2), see Schwarzschild 
(1999: 156-163).
Finally, we adopt Kehler’s (2002) theory of discourse coherence that exploits 
inferences to organize successive utterances in light of predication. This theory 
postulates three primitive categories of predication held among utterances: Re-
semblance, Cause-eect, and Contiguity. Of particular interest here is a subcate-
gory of the first, namely, Parallel. This type of cognition requires that, for each 
two utterances, the interlocutors do two things: (i) identify a relation P1 that ap-
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plies over a set of entities a1, ?, an from the first sentence S1 and a corresponding 
relation P2 that applies over a corresponding set of entities b1, ?, bn from the sec-
ond sentence S2; (ii) infer a common relation R that subsumes P1 and P2, along 
with an imaginable set of common properties Ti of the arguments ai and bi for all 
i. This requirement is summarized in (22) (cf. Kehler (2002: 16)):
(22)Parallel (S1, S2):
 Infer the following from P1(a1, a2, ?) in S1 and P2(b1, b2, ?) in S2:
 a. A common relation R such that R subsumes P1 and P2;
 b.   A set of common properties Ti such that, for all i, Ti(ai) and Ti(bi) 
hold.
For example, let us apply the format of Parallel to (23):
(23) [S1 John-ga   niku-o    itame]-te, [S2  Tom-ga   sakana-o  yaita].
    John-Nom meat-Acc fry-and    Tom-Nom fish-Acc   baked
  ‘[S1 John fried the meat], and [S2 Tom baked the fish].’
Suppose we identify P1(a1, ?, an) with fry(john, meat) from S1 and P2(b1, ?, bn) 
with bake(tom, sh) from S2, then we can infer a common relation R that sub-
sumes P1 and P2 (e.g., R = cook(x, y)), and two common properties T1, such that 
T1(john) and T1(tom) hold, and T2, such that T2(meat) and T2(sh) hold (e.g., T1 
= man(x), T2 = food(x)). Thus, note that we can regard the predication of Paral-
lel as a strategy that requires two given propositions to share some commonalities 
for the relations and arguments consisting in them.
3.2.  Proposals
With the two constraints shown above, the GIVENness Constraint (GC) and 
the Parallel Relation (PR), we propose a rough model of language that consists of 
two different modules, say, sentence grammar (SG) and discourse grammar (DG). 
The point is that these two modules both incorporate the GC and the PR, but in 
their respective ways. More specifically, while DG applies the GC and the PR in 
defining (part of) discourse coherence, SG encodes the GC and the PR in defin-
ing (part of) the lexical entry of FPs, as summarized in (24):
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(24)a.  SG requires FPs to implement the GC under the PR.
 b.  DG requires focus to implement the GC under the PR.
Thus, the respective contributions of FPs and focus are made at different levels, 
suggesting that they be examined separately.
Let us now elaborate on the nature of the FP mo. The gist is that (i) there are 
two types of mo whose respective first arguments are NP (type e) and VP (type 
<e, t>); (ii) the semantics of mo describes alternative semantic objects ALT as 
GIVEN, shown by ALTΓ; (iii) it also imposes the PR between the proposition it 
asserts, P(x), and its ALT, shown by Π(P(x), ALT); and (iv) it further contrasts 
the first argument α to its ALT as an anti-expectation with regard to the second 
argument β, shown by AE(α, ALT, β). The lexical entries of both types are given 
in (25), where the variables x and y are of type e, P and Q of type <e, t>:2)
(25)a. [[moN]]g = λx.λP. [P(x) & ?yΓ.?QΓ. [Π(P(x),Q(y)) & AE(x,y,P)]] 
 b.  [[moV]]g = λP.λx. [P(x) & ?QΓ.?yΓ. [Π(P(x),Q(y)) & AE(P,Q,x)]] 
There are two points to add. First, Π works as designed in (22); it requires us to 
infer a common relation R that subsumes P and Q, and a common property T 
such that T(x) and T(y) hold. Second, the definitions of AE are made in the con-
ditional form, as shown in (26), where ◊(X) means “X is a possible inference:”
(26)Anti-expectation condition
 a.  ?x.?y.?P. [AE(x,y,P) ? ◊(P(y) ? ?P(x))]
 b.  ?P.?Q.?x. [AE(P,Q,x) ? ◊(Q(x) ? ?P(x))]
To show how our whole proposal works, let us first consider the N type of 
mo in light of the oddness of (16b), repeated as (27a), with its partial semantics 
in (27b) (see note 2 for the necessity of Quantier Raising of the mo-phrase in 
this case):
(27)a. # John-wa  [VP1 niku-o   sute ]-tekara  [VP2 sakana-mo   yai]-ta.
   John-Top    meat-Acc dump-after     fish-also     bake-Past
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   ‘After throwing away the meat, John baked also the fish.’
 b.  [[moN]]g([[sakana]]g)([[VP2]]g)
  = [bake(john, sh) & ?yΓ.?QΓ. [Π(bake(john, sh),Q(y)) & ? ]]
Here, suppose that the GIVEN alternatives QΓ and yΓ are identified with λx. 
[throw-away(john, x)] and meat, which are abstracted from the VP1. Then what 
is important is that mo requires the asserted proposition (i.e., bake(john, sh)) 
and the GIVEN content of Q(y) (i.e., throw-away (john, meat)) to share a com-
mon relation R and a common property T. In this case, however, it is very diffi-
cult to infer such a common relation R that subsumes both P and QΓ; what is a 
possible generalization from bake and throw-away? Thus, the oddness of (27a) 
can be reduced to the failure to generalize P and QΓ. Next, let us consider the V 
type of mo in terms of the contrast between (10b) and (11), repeated in (28):
(28)a. # John-wa  [[zutto kai-takat-ta]   DVD]-o   kai-mo-si-ta.  
   John-Top since buy-want-Past DVD-Acc buy-also-do-Past
   ‘John also bought the DVD he had wanted to buy all the time.’
 b.  John-wa  [[zutto kai-takat-ta]   DVD]-o   zenbu  kai-mo-si-ta. 
   John-Top since buy-want-Past DVD-Acc all buy-also-do-Past
   ‘John also bought all the DVDs he had wanted to buy all the time.
The semantic representations of (28a, b) are shown in (29a, b), respectively:
(29) a.  [[moV]]g([[VP]]g)([[John]]g)
  = [buy(j, dvds) & ?QΓ.?yΓ. [? & AE(buy(x, dvds), Q, j)]]
 b. [[moV]]g([[VP]]g)([[John]]g)
  = [buy. all .of(j, dvds) & ?QΓ.?yΓ. [? & AE(buy. all .of(x, dvds) Q, j)]]
To begin, suppose that the GIVEN alternative QΓ is identified with λx.?y.[buy(x, 
y) & dvd(y)], which is somehow obtained from the relative clause. In (29a), then, 
mo requires AE(buy(x, dvds), Q, j) to mean the following (cf. (26b)):
◊(?y.[buy(john, y) & dvd(y)] ? ?buy(john, dvds))
As is clear, however, this is a contradictory inference. That is, it is not valid to 
consider it possible that, if John buys some DVDs, then he does not buy the 
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DVDs; this contradiction results in unacceptability. In (29b), on the other hand, 
the first argument VP of mo denotes buy. all .of, or more exactly, λx.?y. [dvd(y) 
? buy(x, y)], as it contains the universal quantifier zenbu. Thus, mo requires 
AE(buy. all .of(x, dvds), Q, j) to mean the following:
◊(?y.[buy(john, y) & dvd(y)] ? ??y.[dvd(y) ? buy(john, y)])
This is a consistent inference, as it is valid to infer that, if John buys some DVDs, 
then he may not buy every DVD.
3.3.  Analysis
We now analyze the focus effect under our proposal. First, let us consider 
why (30a) can induce at least the three different readings in (30b-d):
(30)a.  John-wa  [VP  [NP  sakana]-o  [V yaki]]-mo   si-ta.
  John-Top       fish-Acc     bake-also   do-Past
  ‘John also baked the fish.’
 b.  If the VP is a focus:
  John baked the sh besides doing something else (e.g., boil the egg)
 c.  If the NP is a focus:
  John baked the sh besides something else (e.g., the beef).
 d.  If the V is a focus:
  John baked the sh besides doing something else with it (e.g., fry).
Under our proposal, the meaning of (30a) includes GIVEN alternatives, such as 
QΓ and yΓ, as shown in (31), so that it is important to determine what utterance 
precedes (30a). Let us consider the three possibilities given in (32):
(31) [[moV]]g([[VP]]g)([[Mary]]g)
 = [bake(mary, sh) & ? QΓ .? yΓ . [Π(bake(mary, sh),Q(y)) & ?]]
(32)Suppose that, before uttering (30a):
 a.  We uttered α such that [[α]]g = boil(john, egg), as in (30b).
  Then the focus of (30a) must be the VP to satisfy the GC.  
 b.  We uttered α such that [[α]]g = bake(john, beef), as in (30c).
  Then the focus of (30a) must be the object to satisfy the GC.
 c.  We uttered α such that [[α]]g = fry(john, sh), as in (30d).
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  Then the focus of (30a) must be the V to satisfy the GC.
To illustrate, we consider the case of (32c). The preceding utterance α is [John 
[VP1 [V1 fried] the sh]], while the utterance in (30a) is [John also [VP2 [V2 baked] 
the sh]]. If the focus of (30a) is the object, then its VP2 cannot find an anteced-
ent in α; for example, it cannot take the VP1 to be an antecedent, as shown in 
(33).
(33)a.  ?-TS([[fried the sh]]g) = ?x. [fry(x)(f)]
 b.  ?-FC([[baked the sh]]g) = ?y.?x. [bake(x)(y)]
 c.  ?-TS([[fried the sh]]g) does not entail ?-FC([[baked the sh]]g).
However, if the focus is the V2, the VP2 can identify the VP1 as an antecedent, as 
shown in (34):
(34)a. ?-TS([[fried the sh]]g) = ?x. [fry(x)(f)]
 b.  ?-FC([[baked the sh]]g) = ?Q.?x. [Q(x)(f)]
 c.  ?-TS([[fried the sh]]g) entails ?-FC([[baked the sh]]g).
Thus, in the case of (32c), the GC in discourse grammar requires the focus of 
(30a) to be the V2, independently of the semantics of mo in sentence grammar. 
This results in a “V-association” reading. The same reasoning is applied to the 
other cases.
Next, let us consider why (35) can induce even a “VP-association” reading:
(35)  John-wa  [VP [NP sakana]-mo  yai]-ta.
  John-Top      fish-also    bake-Past
  ‘John baked also the fish.’
Again, the meaning of (35) under our analysis requires us to consider what ut-
terance precedes (35), because it includes GIVEN alternatives, as shown in (36):
(36) [[moN]]g([[sakana]]g)([[VP]]g)
  = [bake(john, sh) & ? yΓ .? QΓ . [Π(bake(john, sh), Q(y)) & ?]
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The question is how to derive a “VP-association” reading while placing phono-
logical prominence on the object NP. To answer this, we have just to identify the 
focus of (35) with its VP, and it is possible, because the VP contains the promi-
nence on the object NP. For example, let us suppose that (37) is uttered before 
(35):
(37) John-ga  [VP [NP niku]-o    itame]-ta.
  John-Nom    meat-Acc  fry-Past
  ‘John fried the meat.’
Then, if the focus of (35) is the VP, any non-focused constituent of (35) can find 
an antecedent in (37). For example, the TP of (35) can identify that of (37) as an 
antecedent, as shown in (38):
(38)a.  ?-TS([[John fried the meat]]g) = [fry(john)(meat)]
 b.  ?-FC([[John baked also the sh]]g) = ?P. [P(john)]
 c.  (38a) (= the TP of (37)) entails (38b) (= the TP of (35)).
Thus, the GC in discourse grammar requires the focus of (35) to be the VP, inde-
pendently of the semantics of mo in sentence grammar. Moreover, as (37) is ut-
tered before (35), the GIVEN predicate QΓ in (36) can be identified with λx. 
[fry(john, x)].
4. Conclusion
This paper addressed how focus can be involved in the interpretation of ex-
pressions. We began by disproving the “syntactic association” view of FPs that 
employs the c-command condition for FPs and the covert raising of FPs. We in-
stead offered an alternative approach to the focus effect on FPs by isolating the 
contributions of FPs and focus, but still characterizing them as implementing 
the two same constraints: Schwarzschild’s (1999) GIVENness Constraint (GC) 
and Kehler’s (2002) Parallel Relation (PR). The essence of our proposals was that 
FPs and focus manifest the GC and the PR in their respective ways and constrain 
67
a given utterance independently of each other. Thus, we conclude that focus is 
exploited at the semantics-pragmatics interface level to constitute the core of 
discourse coherence.
[Notes]
* I would like to thank Sadayuki Okada for helpful comments and discussions. Any 
errors are of course my own. This work was supported by the Japan Society for the 
Promotion of Science, Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Fellows, No. 241177.
1) We should also posit another rule that “returns” propositions to predicates, such 
as Heim and Kratzer’s (1998: 95) Predicate Abstraction, because only such a rule 
feeds the possibility of Quantier Raising (QR); see also note 2.
2) The N type of mo requires its projection MoP to undergo QR to VP if it is attached 
to the object NP; otherwise, it induces a type mismatch.
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SUMMARY
No Syntactic Association with Focus:
A View from the Japanese Additive Particle Mo
Hideharu Tanaka
This paper discusses the nature of focus in light of Japanese focus particles 
(FPs), especially the additive mo ‘also,’ and addresses how focus can be involved 
in the interpretation of expressions. Traditionally, some researchers claim that 
focus is a semantic argument for FPs, but such an argument-taking relation is 
formed syntactically. We argue against this “syntactic-association” view of FPs by 
empirically disproving its two theoretical devices: the c-command condition for 
FPs and the covert raising of FPs. We instead develop a semantic and pragmatic 
approach to the focus effect on FPs by isolating the contributions of FPs and fo-
cus, but still characterizing them as implementing the two same constraints on 
the cohesion of asserted propositions: the GIVENness Constraint (GC) and the 
Parallel Relation (PR). Specifically, we propose the lexicalized characteristics of 
mo as follows: (i) there are two types of mo whose respective first arguments are 
NP and VP; (ii) the semantics of mo describes alternative semantic objects as 
satisfying the GC; (iii) it imposes the PR between the proposition it asserts and 
its alternative; and (iv) it contrasts its first argument to its alternative as a “more 
surprising” choice with regard to its second argument. The essence of our pro-
posals is that FPs and focus manifest the GC and the PR in their respective ways 
and constrain a given utterance independently of each other. We conclude that 
focus plays a role only at the semantics-pragmatics interface level to form the 
core of discourse coherence.
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